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FOREWORD
Nearly every week, newspapers carry stories of the
failure of the Iraqi police to provide basic civil security
for the citizens of Iraq. Despite millions of dollars in
aid, equipment, education, and advisors, more than 4
years later police force development lags far behind the
military. Numerous reasons are offered to account for
this gap: corrupt practices left over from the previous
regime, infiltration by militias, weak leadership,
competition by better armed and organized criminal
and militant groups, and so on. However, the military
is also subject to these same influences, thus none of
these explanations by themselves or in combination
are satisfactory.
But such an explanation is critical if policymakers
and advisors are going to successfully facilitate police
reform. This paper argues that the poor political
and security environment impacts social, political,
and cultural factors in ways that are predictable,
understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. By
taking all these factors into account, policymakers and
advisors can develop specific programs and strategies
and target them where they will best facilitate reform.
To this end, this paper offers valuable insights into
the creation of such programs as well as a number
of policies and practices advisors may adopt to best
facilitate the creation of a just and effective Iraqi police
force.
		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This paper will seek to show how social, political,
cultural, and environmental factors have combined
to impede Iraqi police development in ways that are
predictable, understandable, and, with external help,
resolvable. The corruption and abuse found in the Iraqi
police services cannot simply be explained by poor
leadership, the actions of a few corrupt individuals, or
even the competing agendas of the various militias that
are fighting for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Rather,
one must explain why such practices occur despite the
fact they are unacceptable according to Iraqi cultural
norms.
Organizations are embedded in culture and society.
Thus to understand the weaknesses as well as the
strengths of an organization, one must understand
how a culture’s basic assumptions and espoused values
shape organizational and individual behavior. Further,
understanding how each of these factors relates to
each other allows observers to understand as well as
predict how environmental factors shape individual
and collective behavior. This ability to understand and
predict is essential to policymakers and advisors as
it will allow them to better determine what kinds of
programs they need to develop as well as where those
programs need to be targeted.
Because they were not essential to the regime’s
survival, the Iraqi police were typically under-resourced
and poorly paid, with the average policeman making
around $5 or less per month. Because of the poor pay
and resources, police were not highly regarded and
often supplemented their income through corruption.
Further, police were typically hired because of their
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family, tribal, or political affiliations, which created
expectations regarding hiring practices which persist
to this day. Though the police had a reputation among
citizens for being able to maintain order, this security
depended a great deal on their reputation for human
rights abuse.
While these practices became habituated to a
degree within the service itself, it would be wrong to
conclude that Iraqi culture saw them as acceptable.
Thus, in the face of considerable pressure from their
own culture—as well as incentives from Coalition
advisors—to reform, it is necessary to look elsewhere
for a satisfactory explanation.
For a more complete account, one must understand
how group ties affect individual identity and
consequently, behavior. One’s identity is often
expressed by the ties one has to various groups,
organizations, and institutions. Iraq is a country where
these ties typically reinforce each other. Whether one
is a Sunni, Shia, or Kurd, one tends to find others with
those same identities in the other groups to which they
belong, including family, political party, and region.
Conflicts between communities of different sets of
reinforcing ties tend to be very difficult to resolve,
absent some external force which compels a resolution.
As such, it is easy to mobilize these communities
against each other, but harder to find ways to resolve
conflicts between them.
By virtue of becoming an Iraqi policeman, an
individual accepts a professional identity that crosscuts these other reinforcing identities. But since in Iraq
reinforcing ties are stronger than cross-cutting ones,
police forces often become a battleground for these
sects rather than a means to unify them. Further, as
the ties that bind Iraqis together as Iraqis disintegrate,
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individuals will turn to smaller and smaller groups for
their basic social needs, especially security. This will
further narrow the scope of loyalty of the Iraqi police.
The failure of the professional identity of “police
officer” to transcend sectarian identity is further
exacerbated by complex cultural factors that have
created a difficult environment in which even dedicated
Iraqi police officers and government officials find it
difficult to make progress. This analysis of identity
is important because in dealing with cross-cultural
police reform, one must be able to distinguish between
genuine moral dilemmas indigenous forces face from
the distortion of values otherwise compatible with just,
effective policing, from corrupt and abusive behavior.
Iraqis will confront corruption, if properly supported.
They are less likely to be willing or even able to break
apart the close relationships which drive many other
decisions, such as hiring, firing, disciplining, and
promotions, even though those decisions may not
always be compatible with the creation of a just and
effective police force.
But it would be wrong to say that for these reasons
it is not possible to reform the Iraqi police. What is
important to note is that these behaviors are a product
of the environment acting on the culture, not simply
of the culture itself. In fact, Iraqi cultural norms find
many of these practices unacceptable. What may be
an important indicator of the potential of Iraqi police
development may be found in a survey conducted by
the Ministry of Interior’s Center for Ethics and Human
Rights. According to this survey, Iraqi police officers
rated themselves high with respect to certain moral and
professional standards but others lower. This outcome
suggests that Iraqi police understand what appropriate
professional and ethical standards are expected but,

vii

given the difficult operating environment, are either
not able or not interested in upholding them.
While this analysis suggests reform can only come
from within the culture, external parties can help
motivate and facilitate reform. To this end, coalition
advisors need to develop a strategy that includes building institutions, mentoring in the field, and establishing organizations capable of providing oversight of
police and ministry activities and operations.
There are committed leaders within the Iraqi
Ministry of Interior and police forces; however, the
“culture of crisis” that has arisen since the fall of
Saddam complicates their ability to make any headway
in reforming the Iraqi police. Despite this, it would be
a mistake to conclude that Iraqi culture is incapable of
sustaining a just and effective police force. Developing
it, however, will require sustained support from
coalition advisors who do not compromise regarding
practices which are incompatible with democratic
policing.
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DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM
OF THE IRAQI POLICE FORCES
In July 2007, more than 4 years after the fall of
Saddam’s regime, a departing Coalition division
commander told the author that the failure of the
local police forces to provide a permanent security
presence was the biggest obstacle to stability in Iraq. In
explaining why this was the case, he cited now familiar
problems associated with the Iraqi police: corruption,
sectarianism, and intimidation by militias and criminal
organizations. Nearly every week, newspapers carry
stories of the failure of the Iraqi police to provide basic
civil security for the citizens of Iraq. Despite the fact that
a strong, democratic police force has been recognized
since the beginning as critical to establishing a stable
democracy in Iraq, its development appears to lag
dramatically behind many other governmental and
security institutions.
Given the millions of dollars in aid, equipment,
education, and advisors the U.S. Government has
spent, it is worth asking why, 4 years later, there seems
to have been little progress. For many observers, in
fact, the failure of the Iraqi police seems to be one of
the biggest surprises of the war in Iraq, as, unlike the
Army, the police were never attacked or disbanded by
Coalition forces. As counterinsurgency expert Bruce
Hoffman noted in his September 2006 congressional
testimony, in the light of the significant improvements
in the Iraqi military, the “lack of progress, and reversal
of previous advances regarding the Iraqi police are all
the more disappointing and disheartening.”1
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of
the difficulties of Iraqi police reform that takes into
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account social, political, cultural, and environmental
factors which, in combination, are impeding Iraqi police
development. There are committed leaders within the
Iraqi Ministry of Interior and police forces; however,
the “culture of crisis” which has arisen since the fall of
Saddam complicates their ability to make any headway
in reforming the Iraqi police. Despite this, it would be
a mistake to conclude that Iraqi culture is incapable of
sustaining a just and effective police force. Developing
it, however, will require sustained support from
Coalition advisors who do not compromise regarding
practices which are incompatible with democratic
policing. This paper will conclude with suggestions for
a way ahead for advisors that allows them to maintain
their integrity while still making progress toward
building an effective force.
A FRAMEWORK FOR CULTURAL ANALYSIS
Organizations are embedded in culture and society.
Cultures and societies, like organizations, are made of
individuals. Individuals manifest the norms of their
larger social and organizational cultures on three
different levels: the artifact, the espoused values, and
the basic assumptions. Artifacts are those outward
manifestations of culture, such as institutions, policies,
rules, and behavior. Espoused values are what
individuals say about their own culture’s sense of
how things are “supposed” to work. Whether or not
a particular individual acts in accordance with those
values will depend on a number of things, some of
them informed by culture, others by personal interests
and individual character. Basic assumptions are those
deeply held beliefs about how the world actually does
function.2
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Artifacts, being sensitive to many different kinds
of considerations, are the easiest aspect of a culture
to change, especially when one may appeal to other
cultural norms to motivate that change. Espoused
values are harder to change, but not impossible,
especially if it may be shown that, in a particular
context, an espoused value conflicts with a basic
assumption. Basic assumptions, on the other hand are
very difficult to change, since these are, by definition,
widely and deeply held beliefs that inform the identity
of the culture in question.3
Though difficult, with effort and time, even basic
assumptions can be changed. Much of the racism
manifested in the U.S. Armed Forces in the 1950s, was
motivated by the basic assumption that, for a variety
of genetic and environmental reasons, members of
nonwhite races were inferior. However, eliminating
racism in the Armed Forces has outpaced the larger
society because U.S. military leadership attacked the
problem at all three levels. In addition to rejecting
the basic assumption, it espoused respect for all
persons as an organizational value and punished any
manifestation of behavior that failed to conform to that
value. A similar strategy will be required if the Iraqi
police are to be transformed into a just and effective
police force.
Ultimately, just as in the U.S. Armed Forces in
the mid-20th century, real change will have to come
from within the Iraqi police. Advisors cannot motivate
this transformation on their own. But just as outside
influences such as the growing civil rights movement
motivated change within the U.S. Armed Forces,
and laws and regulations prohibiting discrimination
emerged, advisors can facilitate this change. To do
this, advisors will need to be able to differentiate basic
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assumptions from espoused values, and espoused
values from artifacts, as well as understand how
environmental factors affect the manifestation of these
artifacts in any particular context. The complexity of
these distinctions means successful advising will take
both time and patience.
It is important to make these distinctions because it
allows the advisor to determine what can be changed
quickly and what cannot. Since approaches aimed at
changing behavior are different than those required
for long-term change, making these distinctions
allows advisors to develop appropriate approaches
for modifying behaviors which undermine the
establishment of a just and effective police force.
Developing these approaches requires advisors to
understand how the multiple identities of Iraqi police
officers and ministry officials impact which basic
assumptions and espoused values they draw on and
how those in turn affect the behavior they manifest.
One’s identity is often expressed by the ties one
has to various groups, organizations, and institutions.
In no society, in fact, does an individual have a single
social identity. Rather one has multiple identities
which are expressed as ties, over varying strength, to
different social institutions. In societies where those
ties reinforce—that is where ties of family, religion,
political affiliation, and so on, are largely made up of
the same people—mobilizing the core group is very
easy since few people within the group would have
any interests represented by the other group with
whom they are in conflict.4
Thus, in Iraq the identities Shia, Sunni, or Kurd
reinforce themselves since they also, to a large extent,
determine not only one’s religious or ethnic identity, but
one’s familial and political identities as well. Conflicts
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between communities of different sets of reinforcing
ties tend to be very difficult to resolve, absent some
external force which compels a resolution. As such, it is
easy to mobilize these communities against each other,
but harder to find ways to resolve conflicts between
them.
In societies where cross-cutting ties are strongest,
conflicts within the society are more difficult to sustain.
This is because members of any particular group
represent the interests of multiple other groups, thus
complicating any effort to mobilize the core group.5 By
virtue of becoming an Iraqi policeman, an individual
accepts the cross-cutting ties associated with an
organization intended to transcend the country’s
other, more sectarian, ties. But since reinforcing ties are
stronger than cross-cutting ones, police forces become
a battleground for these sects rather than a means to
unify them.
UNDERSTANDING IRAQI POLICE FORCES
This paper will characterize the aim of efforts
to reform the Iraqi police as the establishment of an
effective, just police force. “Effective” in this context
means a force capable of enforcing the rule of law, and
“just” in this context means enforcing the rule of law in
a way that respects the individual and collective rights
of all Iraqis, as identified in the Iraqi Constitution.
These are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for the
restoration of stability in Iraq.6 At the outset, it makes
sense to briefly discuss how the police evolved into its
current state in order to discern the best way ahead.
In Iraq, the dynamic relationship of culture and
history, combined with current politics and social
conditions, has created a “culture of crisis” where
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cultural norms otherwise compatible with democracy
and human rights drive some of the worst abuses
and undermine the establishment of an inclusive,
democratic government. This difficulty arises because
crises rarely bring out the best in people and as a result
efforts to reform the Iraqi police forces are routinely
undermined by corruption, sectarianism, and human
rights abuses.
To understand how this culture of crisis impacts
police reform, one must understand how political,
cultural, and operational factors contribute to the
climate of abuse and corruption. The factions that
compose Iraq’s government also sponsor militias
which compete with it and have not truly yielded the
monopoly of the use of force to one central government.
In some cases, elements of these parties have attempted
to co-opt and intimidate security forces to serve their
own sectarian ends. At the local level, conflicts between
these interests are further complicated by political,
economic, tribal, and even family concerns. At every
level, culturally-driven loyalties further complicate
efforts to establish a police force that serves the people,
rather than the government as it did under Saddam’s
regime.
A Brief History.
The first Iraqi police academy was established by
the British in Basra in 1914. In 1947, the Baghdad Police
College was established which formalized the training
of officers to command and administer the Iraqi police
forces.7 As such, Iraqi police are accustomed to a
centralized chain of command and practice a number
of military traditions Westerners may not always
associate with police forces. Despite this centralization
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it is important to note that under Saddam, the Iraqi
police were not the primary forces used to enforce
regime policy. While they did monitor the population
for political activism, enforcement of the Regime’s
suppression of dissent was left to the regime’s security
services.8 As such, they were perceived more as a
corrupt force than an instrument of oppression, but
were, by most accounts, capable of maintaining order
and preventing crime.9
Because they were not essential to the regime’s
survival, the Iraqi police services were typically underresourced and its personnel were poorly paid, with the
average policeman making around $5 or less per month.
Because of the poor pay and resources, police were not
highly regarded and often supplemented their income
through corruption. Further, police were typically hired
because of their family, tribal, or political affiliations,
which created expectations regarding hiring practices
which persist to this day.10 Despite this, the police had
a reputation among citizens for being able to maintain
order, even though there were reportedly fewer police
then than there are now.11 However, this security
depended a great deal on their reputation for human
rights abuse. The author personally watched archived
films where Iraqi police pulled individuals suspected
of some crime and severely beat them right on the
streets where they were detained.
It is also worth pointing out that now for the first
time in history, the purpose of the Iraqi police is to
protect and serve the people, not the state. Few Iraqi
police, however, have models of behavior they can
rely on that are compatible with this paradigm shift.
The same is, in fact, true of Iraqi citizens. Saddam’s
government maintained control of the police through
its security services, which threatened violence, terror,
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and death if police attempts to enforce the law got in
the way of the regime’s thuggery. This “might makes
right” model has permeated Iraqi leadership culture
over generations.12 Replacing it will take time.
Following the fall of the regime, popular resentment
of police corruption as well as their complicity with the
regime led to the looting of police stations and as a result
many police left their jobs.13 Since then, reconstituted
police forces and their families have become a target
for destruction, cooption, or intimidation by both
insurgents and sectarian militias which correctly see
these forces as critical to political control. As reported
in the New York Times, a survey conducted in 2006
in the northeast of Baghdad “found that 75 percent of
Iraqis did not trust the police enough to tip them off to
insurgent activity.”14
Today, the Iraqi police operate in one of the most
brutal operational environments on the planet. Not only
have many died while trying to enforce the law, they
and their families have been the subject of a deliberate
campaign of targeted killings since soon after the fall of
the regime.15 According to an October 2006 assessment,
between September 2005 and October 2006, a total
of 2,842 police had been killed and 5,792 wounded.16
According to a separate Ministry of Interior estimate,
12,000 police had been killed between May 2003 and
December 2006.17 These numbers do not include police
hopefuls killed by suicide attacks while standing in
recruiting lines. In addition to facing an extremely
well-armed and organized opposition, police often are
ostracized by the locals they are supposed to protect.
According to one account, following an attack on a
group of trainees, police took the wounded to a nearby
village which refused them treatment, afraid of being
associated with the police.18 Stories like this have
played repeatedly throughout Iraq.
8

Political and Cultural Constraints.
These historical and environmental factors are not
sufficient to account for all the difficulties and failures
associated with Iraqi police reform. The historical
disposition for corruption is exacerbated by a fractured
government coupled with complex cultural factors
that have created a difficult environment in which
even dedicated Iraqi police officers and government
officials cannot make progress. As each political party
attempts to expand its power and political influence,
it does so by attempting to increase its influence in
Iraq’s security forces. Not only is there high-level
brokering for ministry leadership positions, at the
lowest levels parties—as well as local tribes and other
interests—compete for control over individual police
stations and key officers. As a result, much of the
cooption and intimidation of Iraqi police forces comes
from sources external to the force and is aimed at midlevel commanders and other officials. In many cases,
these mid-level officials are ill-equipped to defend
themselves from retribution if they fail to cooperate.
What these external sources are depend on the
locality. In the south, especially Basra, a number of
Shia factions compete for influence, including Jaysh
al Mahdi, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC),19
and Fadhila, as well as smaller militias and criminal
groups.20 In the west, the conflict with al Qaeda is
often a cover for internecine tribal conflicts usually
over smuggling routes. Conflict over smuggling routes
has placed great pressure on border police who are
threatened by local tribes as well as al Qaeda if they do
not facilitate illicit cross-border operations.
The ministry’s ability to deal with this corruption
is further complicated by the decentralized nature of
9

the new Iraqi police system, where hiring and firing of
individual police and their leadership is largely in the
hands of the provincial government, rather than the
Ministry of Interior. This new political reality, coupled
with influence by outside sectarian forces, has made it
difficult for reforms at the top to have significant impact
at lower levels. In fact, it has set up parallel reform and
reconstruction efforts, where ministry development—
including improvements in the ability of the ministry
to support police operations—are filtered through
provincial governments which have their own interests
and agendas. The ministry’s inability to enforce its
policies, rules, and regulations is a major contributing
factor in the slow pace of Iraqi police development.
Corruption by ministry officials only exacerbated this
problem.21
The decentralized reorganization of the Iraqi police
forces created a new institutional relationship between
the provincial police forces and the Ministry of Interior.
This has resulted in a confusing political environment
where subordinates are uncertain which source of
leadership they should follow. A basic assumption of
Arab culture is to favor centralized authority, where
subordinates follow the orders of their superiors.22 A
system based on such an assumption will not function
well when the institutional sources of leadership are
divided and, sometimes, in conflict.
In such a context, other basic assumptions, such
as the primacy of the group over the individual, will
motivate subordinates to accept the leadership of the
group with which they most strongly identify. Thus
if the choice is between the central government and
the local police chief, the local police chief will almost
always win. This is not to say that the only way to
control the Iraqi police is to reinstitute a strong central
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authority. Arabic leadership styles usually rely more
on consent, than force; thus building strong bases of
support are critical to maintaining power, something
even Saddam Hussein had to recognize.23 Thus,
even leaders with a strong sectarian identity may be
motivated to reach out to other groups, if by doing
so they will increase their hold on power. Thus it is
important to realize the impact decentralization has
had on the way Iraqi police leadership asserts, or fails
to assert, control over subordinate organizations.
Because of this decentralization, as well as the
ongoing divisions within the Iraqi government,
the Iraqi police relate to the central government as
amputees sometimes do to the phantom pains of a
lost appendage. Just as the amputee may act like the
missing appendage is still there, most police look to a
central authority for guidance and support. But often
that guidance and support fails to materialize, or in
some cases, comes from conflicting sources within the
provincial and central governments. Just as often, the
police find themselves in competition for the monopoly
on the use of force. The above discussion goes to one
of the core problems in reforming the Iraqi police—
the absence of a political solution to the question of
Iraqi governance. As long as Iraq’s factions treat the
police as a battleground for control of the government,
a national-level solution to Iraqi police development
will remain elusive.
Paraphrasing Hobbes, when authority breaks down
and a society collapses into a state of nature, “men
will do anything to avoid being poor and solitary.”24
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, when
describing the situation in Beirut during the Lebanese
Civil War, noted “man’s natural state is as a social
animal who will do anything he can to seek out and
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create community and structures when the larger
government or society disappears.”25
In Iraq, the police find themselves in a confusing
array of social ties they must negotiate as larger social
structures fail to coalesce. As in much of the Middle
East, Iraqis are tied together by “interlocking bonds
of family, friendship, and religion.”26 These bonds are
then given moral, as well as practical, weight based
on how the individual places values on the different
elements of his identity. There is, of course, nothing
incompatible with the demands of just, effective
policing present in this prioritization of relationships.
But understanding these values can help the advisor
understand how individuals and groups will respond
when under stress.
As social anthropologist Jeremy Boissevain notes,
“in a situation of conflict persons will attempt to define
the situation and align themselves in such a way that
the least possible damage is done to their basic values
and to their important personal relations.”27 For
Iraqis, like most Arabs, relationships are valued in
proportion to their proximity. Thus, they identify first
with the immediate family, then the extended family
or clan, then the village, and the tribe, followed by
their country and their religious sect.28 This concept
of valuing the closer relationship more and the more
distant relationship less, transfers into organizational
norms as well.
In this cultural context, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
suggests that at each level of social interaction—family,
community, professional—individuals have to begin all
over again meeting those needs in order to attain selfactualization. Thus, in each context, once basic survival
and safety needs are met, individuals will find ways to
meet higher order social needs such as feeling needed,
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developing friendships, and achieving recognition and
success, which are necessary for individuals to feel selfactualized. In the context of Iraqi culture, this suggests
that the close group will always be the one that selfactualizes the individual.29
This means in an organizational context, for
any particular police officer or ministry official, the
requirements of the local station or office will be given
greater weight than the requirements of the larger—
and more distant—authority. This means if one is
forced to choose between one’s immediate supervisor
and adherence to a policy or regulation from a more
distant authority, the immediate supervisor, all other
things being considered, will win. Moreover, to the
individual, deciding this way will seem like the morally
correct thing to do.
This relationship is further complicated by the
absence of a clear political solution to Iraq’s governance.
This is because, as noted earlier, any individual police
officer will have multiple ties which both reinforce
as well as cross-cut. Thus when the requirements
of identities tied to religion and ethnicity, which are
often reinforced by family ties, conflict, these sectarian
interests will often win, even over the demands of the
immediate supervisor. And again, this decision will
seem like the morally correct one to the individual in
question.
Further, as the ties that bind Iraqis together as
Iraqis disintegrate, individuals will turn to smaller and
smaller groups for their basic social needs, especially
security. Thus, these values and considerations will
impact the moral decisionmaking of Iraqi police and
their leaders, especially as long as it is unclear that
the government that will emerge will be one to which
they will consent. In the current security and political
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environment, this means Iraqis at all levels will give
greater moral weight to the concerns of those closest to
them and will have little incentive to give any weight
to civic or even religious duties. In the Iraqi context,
this means loyalty to parties, most of which are largely
made up of those who share common identities,
will often supersede loyalty to the government. For
example, these interlocking loyalties enable the Shia
parties to band together to win the national elections;
but the weakness of these connections then drive them
to violence in order to establish power bases at the
local level, where these otherwise reinforcing bonds
conflict.
An example of how these competing loyalties
complicate police reform occurred in Amarah, the
capital of the Maysan province. After the withdrawal
of the British forces in October 2006, violence erupted
in the city. The competition between the Badr
Organization and its rival, Jaysh al Mahdi, both of
which are part of the same Shia Alliance which won
January 2006’s national election,30 resulted in a chaotic
struggle which the police could not quell. According to
a press report, the fighting in Amarah began when the
head of police intelligence for the Maysan province,
Qassim al Tamimi, who was also associated with the
Badr Organization, was killed by a roadside bomb,
believed to be planted by Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), the
militant faction loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr.
The Badr Organization, which had a significant
presence in the police, then retaliated by kidnapping
the brother of the JAM commander and demanding
the handover of Tamimi’s killers. This led to clashes
between the groups—all of which had representatives
in the local police force and provincial government. In
these clashes, 22 civilians were killed.31
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Another example of how this confused political
atmosphere has complicated Iraqi police development
occurred in Babil province. There the police chief, whose
brother was reportedly a member of the Dawa Party,
was profoundly politically neutral and pro-Coalition.
By all accounts of U.S. personnel working with him,
he was committed to democracy and a unified Iraq. He
resisted efforts by the provincial council, which was
heavily influenced by the SIIC, Dawa, and to a lesser
extent JAM and other members of the Shia alliance,
all of which wanted to increase their influence in the
police. The council repeatedly tried to bypass standard
recruiting practices to get loyalists into police training—
displacing hundreds of Sunnis who had been promised
spots at the academy through the appropriate process.
If they were successful, they would increase sectarian
control over an ethnically diverse province.
Eventually, in frustration, the council voted to fire
the police chief, which it had the right to do in accordance with Iraqi law. If the firing had been successful,
the council would have been able to solidify sectarian
control over the province and isolate the Sunnis in the
north, thus increasing the likelihood of unrest. In fact,
in response to the previous attempts by the council,
Sunnis in the province threatened demonstrations at the
police academy should their candidates be displaced.
However, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Bayan
Jabr, himself a member of SIIC, intervened to prevent
the police chief’s dismissal.32 It is difficult to explain
exactly why he did this. It could have been because
he wanted to preserve a competent and experienced
police chief. It could also have been out of deference to
his senior U.S. advisors, with whom he enjoyed a good
relationship.
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Most likely, it was a combination. Jabr was under
considerable pressure from other SIIC leaders to
increase its presence, and thus influence, in the police
forces, but he also seemed to understand the importance
of continued Coalition support to developing Iraqi
police forces. This patronage may have given him the
political clout he needed within his own organization
to stand up to those elements that wanted the police
chief fired.
The Cultural Role of the Iraqi Leader.
To understand how to influence effectively Iraqi
leader decisionmaking, one must understand the basic
assumptions and espoused values associated with the
role the Iraqi leader perceives himself as playing. In
Bedouin tribal culture, a primary role of the leader
is to increase the material resources available to the
tribe. Further, this can be done at the expense of other
tribes. As such, a leader’s status is often determined
by the ability to bring in resources while giving away
as little as possible. This was best done by seeking
patronage from external sources, such as a stronger
tribe, trading partner, or central government.33 In such
arrangements, though the commitment to the patron
was merely contractual, the requirement to maintain
the relationship was moral, since it benefited the tribe.
Saddam’s ability to exploit this fact was a key element
in his ability to maintain control over the country for
more than 3 decades.34
This dynamic transfers into other kinds of leadership as well. Just as under Saddam, the current Iraqi
leaders instinctively look to external sources for patronage. To the extent one is perceived as a patron, one
can enter into the Iraqi leader’s moral decisionmaking
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process as one becomes a means for him to fulfill his
moral obligations to his group. How this patronage
plays out in current Iraqi politics is complex, as many
leaders’ identities, and thus loyalties, cross over many
social ties. While many of these leaders recognize that
national, ministry, and party interests are inextricably
entwined, they are also disposed to give greater weight
to those closest to them. Thus they find themselves in
a complex balancing act where often the greater good
gets subordinated to the local interests.
Thus an important component of Iraqi leadership
style is bringing these needs together. For this reason,
it has long been a practice of Iraqi leadership to
bring family members and close relations into the
organization which they manage. Not only does this
protect against possible betrayal, it also serves to
enhance one’s status within the group one most closely
identifies with—whether that be family, clan, tribe or
party. This practice also serves to bring the interests
of the groups represented by reinforcing ties into
alignment.
The practice of using one’s connections and
influence to get close relatives and associates good jobs
or promotions is prevalent in much of the Middle East.
The better one is able to provide these opportunities,
the greater is one’s wasta which is roughly translated
as “influence.” The greater one’s wasta, the better able
one is to provide more opportunities for one’s inner
circle. In this way, one can continually increase one’s
status within the society.
In many places, this practice is limited by the rule
that the person hired must be qualified for the job. Thus
while the practice may not be optimal—since the best
person often is not hired—it is also not dysfunctional.
Being rooted in the basic assumptions and espoused
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values of traditional Arab culture, it is also not a practice
that will easily be set aside. In Iraq, however, the
breakdown of social institutions forces leaders to put
greater weight on surrounding themselves with people
they can trust, regardless of their qualification, which
displaces others who are qualified. This environmental
factor then distorts the values associated with honoring
one’s close commitments in a way that is incompatible
with just, effective policing in Iraq.
For these reasons, Jabr, as other Iraqi leaders,
brought a number of his own party members (SIIC and
Badr Corps) into the ministry—a fact he was very open
about.35 What Jabr ultimately failed to recognize was
that those he brought on often continued to serve party
interests over the ministry’s and engaged in illegal and
sectarian activity. This created a divisive atmosphere
within the ministry that he was unable to overcome.
Ultimately, he lost the support of the Coalition and his
party lost control over the ministry.
Current Interior Minister Jowad Bulani, himself a
one-time member of the Fadhila party, has by most
accounts done a much better job balancing the needs of
the ministry over those of any other competing interest.
But his efforts to enact genuine reforms have been
limited because he did not bring on a large number
of loyalists into the organization. This dynamic of
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” is a feature
of Iraqi politics that will take years to overcome.
Because this prioritizing of the local good over the
greater good can be perceived as moral, it is a difficult
practice for advisors to deal with. Such practices are
certainly incompatible with effective, just, policing but
at the same time, telling an Iraqi leader at any level he
must betray those closest to him will only alienate the
advisor. While advisors must refuse to tolerate such
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practices, they must also make space for culturally
appropriate solutions that may run counter to Western
policing norms.
By way of illustration, consider the following
story told to the author by U.S. advisors to the Babil
police department, which underscores the point that
even a just policy may not always function in ways
Coalition advisors might expect. In this incident, the
police chief’s brother was implicated in the murder of
a member of a rival party. But rather than arrest him,
the police chief paid “blood money” to the victim’s
family, in accordance with Iraqi custom. In a Western
setting, this kind of familial favoritism would have
been grounds to fire the police chief, if not prosecute
him. In the Iraqi context, his actions can be considered
skillful keeping of the peace which ultimately upheld
both the duty of the police chief to maintain order and
the deeply seeded communal values of Iraqi society.
Culturally-driven considerations also result in
considerable variation in terms of how subordinates,
even those accused of violating Iraqi law, are treated.
In early 2006, U.S. advisors confronted the Minister
of the Interior over allegations that a certain police
brigade commander abused detainees.36 This brigade
was considered highly successful as its operations had
substantially decreased insurgent activity in its area of
operations. Eventually, the Minister agreed to relieve
the commander. However, a few months later, the
commander turned up on the ministry staff.
This failure to consistently apply Iraqi law in this
commander’s case did not conform to the expectations
of many of the advisors and increased concern that
the Iraqi leadership was not committed to reform. But
these expectations did not fully take into account how
cultural and political constraints impacted on the way
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the Iraqi leadership could deal with the situation. In the
West, justice is viewed in terms of holding individuals
responsible for the rules they break. In determining how
to handle violations, the only considerations Westerners
typically take into account are those that pertain to the
individual’s ability to understand right and wrong in
that particular case and his ability to avoid that wrong.
This may not eliminate responsibility, but it does tend
to mitigate judgments about the individual’s liability.
This is not true in Iraq.
As noted above, what will also matter to Iraqis is
the relationship of the subordinate to the person in
authority. The number and quality of overlapping ties
that exist between the two individuals will affect how
the person in authority punishes the subordinate. This
is in large part due to the fact that in many Middle
Eastern cultures, one is not viewed primarily as an
individual, but rather as a member of a community,
whether it is family, clan, or tribe. Thus, when harm
comes to the individual, it is felt by the community,
and the community then is obligated to redress the
grievance.37 When one shares the same community
identity with the person being punished, one’s relations
with one’s own community can be greatly complicated,
especially if other communities or interests benefit
from the punishment of the transgressor.
As a result, depriving the brigade commander
of his livelihood could create a number of political
enemies for the ministry, undermining its effectiveness
and putting its members at risk.38 This last point is
important. What a Western advisor may view as crass
favoritism may be justifiable to Iraqis as a proper
expression of filial loyalties as well as the most efficient
means to achieve the larger organizational and even
moral goals. Advisors must not tolerate corruption or
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abuses in any form, but they must be able to distinguish
practices which the culture sees as justifiable—and thus
not corrupt—from practices which the culture sees as
corrupt, but tolerates. Each must be addressed, but
they must be addressed in different ways. The latter is
more often a matter for enforcement; the former more
a matter of education.
While we will come back to this point later, it
is important to note that making this distinction is
critical in establishing expectations for reform. Just
because a culture accepts a certain practice does not
mean the practice is compatible with effective, just
policing. But if those artifacts are compatible with
the culture’s espoused values and basic assumptions,
then changing that behavior will take time. Thus,
expectations regarding police reform need to reflect
that fact. Further, the more these practices are bound up
in meeting psychological and social needs determined
by culture, the harder they will be to eliminate.
It is also important to understand that from the point
of view of an Iraqi police or ministry official, accepted
cultural practices applied in the current context may
place him a situation where he is torn between what he
perceives as competing moral demands. Such situations
can be further complicated by an organizational
culture that does not necessarily see the commander’s
behavior as wrong, or at least views it as justifiable
given the circumstances.39 To the extent the brigade
commander’s behavior is not viewed as unjust, his
community would then have a cultural obligation to
act, violently if necessarily, in response to the loss of
one of their community member’s livelihood.
Balancing these interests will often manifest itself
in what will appear to be very inconsistent treatment
of those suspected of corruption, human rights abuse,
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or other illegal activity. Thus U.S. advisors should not
be surprised when Iraqi leaders fail to impose similar
punishments for similar offenses. This is not to say that
U.S. advisors should leave such issues unaddressed, but
they must recognize the social and cultural pressures
that drive this inconsistency, and if possible, address
them as well. In some cases, it may be appropriate to
withhold support or even take enforcement into their
own hands. As patrons, the threat of withholding
support is often the most effective way to motivate
Iraqi leaders to take action.
Withholding support can be difficult, especially
when it is critical to the continued development of
Iraqi police capabilities. The question is, then, how to
wield this tool without compromising the successful
development of Iraqi police forces. When used
judiciously, it can have the positive effect of relieving
pressure on the Iraqi leadership, allowing them to take
action, without suffering setbacks which can undermine
their position within the organization and ultimately
their ability to lead. What this analysis suggests is that
knowing when to threaten to withhold support or to
tolerate some inconsistency will require judgment on
the part of the advisor.
Advisors can also address those cultural and social
pressures which drive the inconsistent behavior. They
can do this by reinforcing decisions to uphold the
rule of law and human rights with additional support
or resources for the organization. While the western
view may hold that leaders have a duty to consistently
enforce the law, regardless of relationship, it is
important to understand that Iraqis may see this duty
as one among many. But if a leader’s decision results
in more resources for the group, then it is easier for
that leader to make that decision. But if making such

22

a decision leaves a leader in a worse situation relative
to his close relations, then it will be difficult for him to
make that decision, regardless of his commitments to
upholding the rule of law.
Organizational and Leadership Constraints.
Beginning with Abd al-Karim Qasim’s seizure of
power in 1958,40 Iraq’s decades of harsh dictatorship,
resource limitations, and the brutality of current
hostilities, has created conditions leading to human
rights abuses which sincere efforts on the part of U.S.
and Iraqi officials have not been able to eliminate.
The occasional revelations of such abuses have gone
a long way to stoke popular animosity towards the
government and further divide the Iraqi public.41 In
addition to a higher tolerance for abusive treatment,
Iraq’s authoritarian legacy, reinforced by basic cultural
assumptions favoring centralized authority, has left
many Iraqis with a leadership that respects authority
but which does not accept responsibility for the
behavior of subordinates who follow orders they did
not give.
This decoupling of authority and responsibility
has created a situation where Iraqi leadership, some
of whom were victims of torture themselves, sincerely
denounce torture, but also do not see themselves as
responsible for eliminating it from their organizations.
This is further complicated by the role confession plays
in the Iraqi justice system.
There are numerous examples to illustrate the
difficulty in getting a handle on detainee abuse in
Iraq. In January 2004, the following story was related
to the author by British soldiers in Basra. They had
recently established a police intelligence unit whose
responsibility was to assist local security forces in
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targeting insurgent forces in the area. They reported
that they had left the unit alone for a few weeks, and
when they returned they found evidence of detainee
abuse, including devices used in torture. When they
told the intelligence unit this practice would not be
tolerated, the incredulous Iraqis asked, “How else do
you get a confession?” This story is important because
it underscores the importance of how confession in
law is influenced by Islamic jurisprudence and how
an otherwise just concept can lead to abuse in Iraq’s
culture of crisis.
While Islamic law (Sharia) accords confession a
special evidentiary status, it does not permit judges
to accept confessions which are coerced. 42 However
under Saddam’s regime, this reasonable constraint
was perverted, and torture was frequently used to
obtain confessions in order to provide a veneer of
legitimacy for otherwise unjust legal proceedings.
Today, because of limited investigative and forensic
capabilities as well as poor record keeping, confession
is often the only evidence available to the judges of
the barely-functional Iraqi courts. Poor record keeping
and inexperienced police investigators, coupled with
a great deal of distrust between Ministry of Justice
investigators and the police, have made it difficult
to provide comprehensive and compelling forensic
evidence to the courts. This often means confession
will be the most reliable means to a conviction.
Given the pressure resulting from the current
poor security environment, it is not surprising some
interrogators will go to extreme lengths to ensure a
conviction. This is because values associated with
protecting the group represented by the strongest set of
reinforcing ties do not extend to those outside the group,
even if there are some cross-cutting ties. In fact, for
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those within the immediate group, there are a number
of ways to deal with violations, even betrayal, that will
not involve law enforcement, as noted in the case of the
Babil Police Chief’s brother. Consequently, eliminating
detainee abuse will be greatly facilitated by increasing
the capacity of the Iraqi courts and investigators, thus
eliminating the need for what is culturally deemed an
unfortunate but necessary practice.43
How the Iraqi police leadership interprets their
duties and responsibilities also affects the efforts to
eliminate detainee abuse. The following incident
illustrates this point. When the previously mentioned
abuse was uncovered at a detention facility near the
ministry headquarters known as “Site 4,” U.S. advisors
confronted the National Police commanders who were
responsible for the units which operated the site. At
first, the senior National Police leadership rejected any
responsibility for the incident since they had not, in
fact, authorized the abuse. In fact, while the abusive
treatment was facilitated by members of the National
Police, it was actually conducted by interrogators
who belonged to a separate organization, which
made them difficult to identify. Thus in the view of
the National Police leadership, their organization
was not responsible for the abuse since they had not
ordered it nor were the personnel under their direct
control responsible for it, despite the fact the detainees
remained in National Police custody throughout the
time of the abuse. Therefore, they were slow in taking
action against the perpetrators and facilitators until
U.S. officials threatened to withhold support.
From the perspective of the individual guards
involved, they were simply following orders. That such
a rationale holds moral force is not surprising given that
surveys conducted by the Ministry indicate that police
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hold the values of loyalty and duty higher than justice,
even justice by their own standards.44 This is especially
so in the Iraqi context, where failure to follow orders
historically could have severe consequences for one and
one’s family. In fact, because it is a basic assumption
of Iraqi culture that one will give the most weight to
family ties, the family is an especially vulnerable point
for Iraqi police, who will often betray other espoused
values and loyalties in order to protect them.
In such an environment, orders, even unjust ones,
enter the moral decisionmaking process weighted
equal to or better than the rules of justice which they
then displace. Thus where following orders is the
highest value, the maxim, “do not torture,” which
many will readily accept as an espoused value, does
not necessarily translate as “do not permit torture,”
especially when other authority figures are present.
This organizational climate creates a kind of
“responsibility vacuum” where those at the top have all
the authority, but only consider themselves responsible
for what they order others to do, and then only if
they were the originator of the order. At the bottom,
the individual has all the responsibility for ensuring
they accomplish assigned tasks successfully, but no
responsibility (or authority) to question or modify
those orders. In such an environment, it is not hard to
see how persons in intermediate or lateral authority
can undermine genuine reforms emanating from the
top.
In fact, a number of new police have entered the
force, taking the lessons of ethics they received at the
academy to heart. One student at the Baghdad Police
College told an American instructor that he wanted to
be ethical, but his superior, a police major, made him
go collect bribes from around the district. Given the
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importance of submission to authority, he felt he had
no choice. This kind of story is also repeated many
times in Iraq. This bifurcation of “right” results from
the twin imperatives to maintain a cohesive group and
obey the law. When the two imperatives conflict; the
needs of the group win. But this should not be taken to
mean that Iraqis do not see just enforcement of the law
as right. Rather, despite understanding the right thing,
and desiring to do the right thing, a strong culturally
informed disposition to submit to authority, can
conflict with this understanding and desire to make
reform difficult.
For this, as well as other reasons, true reform can
only occur if there is will within the Iraqi leadership
to make it happen. It makes sense, then, for advisors
to identify influential people within the organization
as well as the larger culture and enlist their efforts to
communicate the need for and path to abandoning
corrupt practices. Further confusing the situation was
the elimination of the laws for disciplining the police.
Without a law or regulation covering a particular
practice, police commanders and supervisors are
unsure how or even whether to hold their subordinates
accountable for corrupt practices.
As of 2006, new laws had been submitted to
parliament, but it may take some time for them to
translate into a clear set of procedures by which Iraqi
police may be prosecuted. Further, under Saddam,
police fell under a separate legal system, administered
much like the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with a
separate court system and detention facilities for police
found in violation of laws, rules, and/or regulations.
Today, police who are accused of corruption or abuse
are tried under the already overtaxed civilian legal
system, which has a poor record for swift justice.
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In such a confused situation, the only recourse is
to raise the issue to the ministry level. But then any
ensuing investigation becomes one more burden
for an overly taxed administration to manage. This
almost guarantees that despite the best intentions of
the investigator, the investigation itself will take a long
time to complete and will probably not begin before
those guilty of abuse and corruption have had time to
cover up any evidence. In such an environment, it is
extremely difficult to distinguish between sincere but
under-resourced efforts to investigate wrong-doing
and half-hearted attempts to appease the Coalition
need for accountability.
At this point it is worth mentioning some of the
difficulties in addressing specific allegations of abuse.
The author once received a phone call from a member
of the U.S. military who worked on the U.S. Embassy
staff. The staff member had just received a phone
call from a high ranking member of the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) who reported that three close relatives
were arrested on suspicion of being insurgents and
were being held at “the MoI hospital” in Yarmuk
since they were injured during the arrest. The official
added that they were being denied treatment by “MoI
intelligence.” He reported that one had died and the
others would die as well.
In investigating the incident, the author discovered
that the Yarmuk Hospital was under control of the
Ministry of Health (MoH), which, at the time, was
headed by a minister close to the radical Shia cleric
Muqtadah Sadr. The confrontation was not between
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, but
between the MoD and the Facilities Protection Service
(FPS) forces of the MoH. The Iraqi had misidentified
the security service as MoI because under Saddam,
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FPS forces did fall under the MoI and wore uniforms
closely resembling police. They were moved to control
of the individual ministries by the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) in order to prevent too much power
accumulating under one ministry, but outwardly, they
still looked very much like Iraqi police.
This was not an isolated incident. The author
received a number of calls to investigate illegal
detention or abuse by MoI forces only to find that the
accusations were baseless. This does not mean there
were not a number of times when the allegations
were accurate, but Iraqis are all too quick to cry “Wolf
Brigade,”45 when confronted with the increasing
violence in Iraq. This can make holding MoI forces
accountable difficult. Accusers typically pin the blame
for abuse on units which have a public reputation for
such abuses. But absent evidence, or being caught in
the act, Iraqi police leaders will typically blame such
abuse on units that either look like the police (such as
the FPS) or which have disguised themselves as police.
Because both explanations are equally plausible, it is
difficult for advisors to sort out the competing claims
and effect reforms.
Despite this confusion between authority and
responsibility, it would be wrong to conclude that MoI
leadership does not take eliminating human rights
abuses seriously. Current Minister of the Interior
Jowad al Bolani, who had just taken over as Minister
when the Site 4 incident occurred, visited the detainees.
During the visit he apologized to the detainees, spent
time discussing with the detainees their role in a future
Iraq, and instructed the National Police leadership
present to provide the detainees with food, water, and
other necessities they were lacking. Of particular note,
he told the senior police officer present that there were
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good people in the cells and they should be treated
as such. The author was present at this incident and
was struck when the detainees applauded the minister
when he departed the facility. Apparently, certain
nationalist themes do resonate across sects.
What may be an important indicator of the potential,
as well as the pitfalls, of the ethical development of
Iraqi police are the results of a survey conducted by
the MoI’s Center for Ethics and Human Rights. As part
of the survey, Iraqi police officers rated how well they
and others upheld professional and moral standards of
(1) taking responsibility for one’s actions; (2) standing
up for what is right by taking action when in the face
of moral and legal violations; (3) acting honestly, and
maintaining integrity; (4) demonstrating openness by
accepting others’ perspectives and points of view; and
(5) upholding high moral standards which allow citizens to live together peacefully. They consistently rated
themselves high with respect to these standards and
others lower, though still relatively high. This survey
suggests that Iraqi police understand what appropriate
professional and ethical standards are expected but,
given the difficult operating environment, are either
not able or not interested in upholding them.
Further, as noted earlier, the survey indicated that
Iraqi police valued loyalty, service, honor, and duty
over justice, religious commitment, and trust. This
further accounts for why many otherwise committed
Iraqi police will stand by while others commit gross
violations. Loyalty, service, and duty must have
an object. One is loyal to, serves, or has a duty to
someone or something. Honor is bestowed when one
fulfills the obligations to the object of loyalty, service,
and duty. When those objects are individual leaders
or organizations and not objective inclusive norms
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derived from well-formed notions of justice, religious
commitment or trust, corruption will likely result.
These difficulties are to be expected in autocratic
organizations where initiative is stifled and decisions
about right and wrong are only for those at the top. But
the fact that this survey was conducted by Iraqi police
for the purpose of developing programs to address
these shortcomings indicates a realization on the part of
many police that they are not currently living up to their
own ideals of justice, as well as indicating willingness
to reform. Realizing there is a problem is critical to
enacting any solution. A number of Iraqis have told the
author that they recognize the ethical shortcomings of
the police but do not know how to reform the current
institutions to address those shortcomings.
U.S.-IRAQI INTERACTION
On the surface, the above description of the state
of Iraqi police services paints a bleak picture for the
hope of genuine reform. With something like this
description in mind, many U.S. advisors have held
back developing the necessary relationships required
to build an effective and democratic police force. Others
have limited their interaction to making demands on
Iraqi officials and police to conform to internationally
recognized standards regarding human rights and
corruption and then monitoring their compliance. In
other cases, some have succeeded in convincing Iraqis
to adopt those standards, but were later undermined by
the poor ethical climate in the Iraqi police forces. This
sometimes “conflicted” interaction has created a great
deal of miscommunication and unmet expectations
between U.S. advisors and Iraqis alike.
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When advisors present reforms or recommendations
as a “higher” standard that the Iraqi police officer should
adopt in order to fulfill his obligations, they are usually
met with resistance at worst or misunderstanding at
best. While Iraqis will recognize their organization’s
shortcomings, they are resentful of outside pressure
to reform, particularly when that standard does not
recognize how the basic assumptions of Iraqi culture
are manifested in the current political and security
environment. Thus, much of this resentment is due to
a failure on the part of the advisor to recognize and
engage the Hobbesian world in which the Iraqi officer
lives. Iraqi police officers are rarely choosing between
upholding democratic ideals and corruption; rather, in
the zero-sum game of Iraqi politics, they are choosing
between life and death. In such cases, like most people,
most will choose life, even if that means participating
in or turning a blind eye to corruption and human
rights abuse.
The kind of interaction that results in more lasting
success is when advisors create conditions that bring
out the positive aspects of the indigenous culture,
rather than trying to impose one on their own. This is
difficult to do and requires exceptional understanding
of the culture, which even many experienced advisors
do not possess. Often the best advisors can do is
to encourage the creation of institutions within the
police forces which are responsible for professional
and ethical development, but institutions in which the
Iraqis are invested.
Institution Building.
In fact, the absence of any positive Iraqi model
of ethical policing is one of the biggest obstacles to
effective police reform.46 This suggests that exposing
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Iraqi police to positive models of police behavior,
whether through education or exchange programs, is
an essential element to police reform. Iraqis need time
to watch and learn how other police forces protect
and serve their people. But mere exposure will not be
sufficient. Strict enforcement of the rules that support a
positive model of policing is also required. Police guilty
of corruption and abusive behavior will also need to be
held accountable.
Advisors will also have to deal with abuses within
their own respective forces. Iraqis are quick to juxtapose
their own failures with known and reported instances of
U.S. abuses. Such abuses on the part of U.S. forces send
a conflicting message to Iraqi police who sometimes
conclude the advisors are merely paying lip service
to human rights considerations and do not genuinely
accept the reforms they are trying to motivate. Most
Iraqis cannot separate the few “bad apples” from the
good ones. This dynamic suggests prosecuting one’s
own cases of corruption will be a necessary condition for
any serious police reform. It also suggests that advisors
would do well to resist feelings of moral superiority:
Given similar circumstances, no society is immune
from such corruption nor is any society incapable of
sustaining a just and effective police force.
An example of such institution building was the
creation of the Ministry of Interior’s Ethics Center. The
purpose of the center was to promote ethics education
at the institutional level as well as in the field. Prior
to the creation of the center, ethics education was
conducted by American police trainers relying on
curriculum developed by the United Nations. As
evidenced by continued accounts of corruption and
abuse, for reasons previously discussed, these efforts
had little impact.
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So to increase Iraqi “buy-in” to ethics education,
Coalition advisors offered to support the creation of
an ethics center that would be staffed by Iraqi police
officers with experience in the field as well as in
education. Numerous Iraqi leaders with whom the
author worked to establish the center were enthusiastic
about having a venue through which their ideals, often
religiously motivated, could be communicated.
Shortly after its inception and in the wake of detainee
abuse scandals associated with the National Police,
the center produced curriculum specifically aimed at
eliminating detainee abuse and even completed an
ethical climate survey of the Iraqi police mentioned
previously. What is most remarkable is that these
events occurred despite the kidnapping and murder of
the center’s director, Brigadier General Osama Badri,
who was killed shortly after visiting a Baghdad school
where he was extolling the virtues of community
policing.47
Remarkably, despite this setback, the center has still
been able to recruit qualified Iraqis to serve on the staff,
though it has yet to fully recover from the loss. In fact,
the executive officer of the center was also kidnapped
and held for 45 days before being released. Despite that,
he returned to work. The Iraqis who have stood up to
join the center understand the damage corruption does
and are working to develop educational materials to
combat it, despite the risk to their families. 48 They keep
stepping up to the plate for three reasons: (1) it is their
ethics center; (2) they believe it will be supported by
the Ministry; and (3) most importantly, its success will
guarantee continued patronage by the Coalition. It will
take time, however to tell if it will also have a positive
impact. But the fact it seems to be enduring is reason to
be encouraged.
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In the Field.
What the previous analysis suggested is that
simply turning out trained, committed police will
be insufficient to reform the force. Yet, U.S. efforts
from 2003 to 2005 were largely focused on institution
building—that is, creating and developing national
level institutions capable of training, employing, and
sustaining police forces—but leaving police out in
many of the provinces largely on their own. 49 As a
result, a large number of trained, but inexperienced
police entered the Iraqi police forces and were quickly
co-opted by criminal and sectarian elements and faced
the choice of participating in corrupt and/or sectarian
activities or at best expulsion from the force or at worst,
death. As a result, some were co-opted, some quit, and
others were not hired at all.
What they specifically had to deal with—whether
sectarian pressure, insurgent intimidation, or
corruption—depended largely on where they were
assigned. According to one Coalition advisor working
with the police academy in Hilla, a video of a police
squad confronted by better-armed members of the
Mahdi militia showed one lone newly minted police
officer standing up to Jaysh al Mahdi intimidation
despite the capitulation of his colleagues. In the video,
the militia members cornered the police squad and
demanded they turn their weapons over to them. After
a bit of arguing, the officer in charge agreed. The new
recruit made an impassioned plea to his squad to stand
their ground, and when he failed, threw the weapon at
the Jaysh al Mahdi commander and left. Had there been
somewhere else to turn for support, this engagement
may have turned out differently.50
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This suggests that close partnership between Iraqi
police forces and Coalition troops and advisors out in the
field is necessary to sustaining the training conducted
at the academies.51 This point has not been lost on the
current Coalition leadership in Iraq, which, since 2005
has been increasing the number of police trainers in the
field.52 According to press reports, 17,000 additional
U.S. troops were distributed to Baghdad’s nine police
districts during the Spring of 2007.53 It must also be
noted that this is the most risky element of Coalition
efforts to reform Iraqi police. As such, its sustainability
is directly affected by the number of casualties and the
political will to sustain them.
Policing the Police.
Partnering with Iraqi police is a means to
institutional success, not an end. Critical to ending
the need for close partnering with police in the field
is the creation of an independent internal affairs and
inspector general. Here again, there has been moderate
success, but external pressures make it difficult to
make lasting reforms. According to the June 2006 InStride Assessment, the Ministry of Interior’s Internal
Affairs Division (IAD) “investigated more than 96
cases, completing 61, of which 28 resulted in court
convictions and 16 resulted in internal discipline.”
According to the document, investigations involved
“blackmail, abuse of authority, extortion of civilians,
as well as aiding terrorists and insurgents.”54
Further, the director of the IAD continued to press
cases despite numerous assassination attempts against
himself, the successful assassination of his brother, and
pressure from other directors in the ministry who saw
him as a threat. Despite these pressures, he continued
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to vigorously investigate cases which did lead to action
against corrupt elements of the ministry and police
forces.
Despite his willingness to investigate, his ability to
turn investigations into actual prosecutions was limited
by a number of factors, the most important of which was
an unreliable enforcement arm, especially out in the
provinces. Given the decentralization of control over
the police forces to the provinces, efforts to conduct
investigations outside the Ministry were met with
resistance, especially where individuals with strong
local connections were involved. For example, despite
attempts to establish a viable internal affairs office in
Basra, local forces, loyal to either to local politicians
or the Jaysh al Mahdi, continually undermined these
efforts and even established competing offices.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ADVISING WITH
INTEGRITY
While this paper has described the nature of the
difficulties involved, it has also described reasons
for hope that change, over time and with continued
engagement, is possible. This paper has also attempted
to convey that while advisors would be naïve to believe
that they understand Iraqi culture, they can learn to
observe cultural practices and discern between those
which reflect basic assumptions and espoused values
and those which are merely tolerated.
This is important because in dealing with crosscultural police reform, one must be able to distinguish
between genuine moral dilemmas indigenous forces
face from the distortion of values otherwise compatible
with just, effective policing, from corrupt and abusive
behavior. Iraqis will confront corruption, if properly
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supported. They are less likely to be willing or even
able to break apart the close relationships which drive
many other decisions, such as hiring, firing, disciplining,
and promotions, even though those decisions may not
always be compatible with the creation of a just and
effective police force.
More importantly, the advisor/advisee relationship
creates its own culture with its own etiquette and
expectations. Iraqis have expectations of their advisors
based on their own understanding of the advisors’
culture. Despite occasional revelations of Coalition
abuses, Iraqis expect Coalition advisors to condemn
corruption and human rights abuse and often look
to them to take action to eliminate it. This dynamic
can be both positive and negative. On the positive
side, this dynamic allows the advisor to provide Iraqi
leaders with additional moral and political support to
overcome competing interests of closer relations. On
the negative side, advisors run the risk of becoming a
crutch, achieving short term ends without engendering
any real development.
Finally, the worst thing advisors can do is turn
a blind eye to any practice incompatible with just,
effective policing. Doing so is perceived by Iraqis as an
endorsement of the practice, which will then quickly
spread, especially if it is perceived to yield immediate
practical benefits. What remains to be discussed is how
U.S. advisors can effectively resolve clashes of their own
values with practices of Iraqi police forces, and create
a new set of norms around which advisors and Iraqis
alike can set expectations and reduce frustration.
The central difficulty for many advisors is that
while they themselves may not have witnessed
corruption or abuse, they know that the support they
provide police forces has contributed to such crimes.
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Unfortunately, simply withholding support does not
resolve the problem as much as postpone it. Such
support is critical for police force development and
withholding support discourages reforms. Thus any
successful framework will find a way to maintain the
integrity of commitments to well-founded values of
fairness and human dignity with the strong possibility
that those commitments will be violated by those the
advisor supports.
To establish institutions capable of developing and
administering an ethical police force, implementing
an approach that is sensitive to the culture and
environment is more important than strict compliance
with specific norms, applied without consideration
of the context. But as noted above, successful reform
of the police force will require sustained will on the
part of the Iraqis, increased institutional capacity for
administration as well as self-policing, and relatively
open access to Iraqi police facilities and operations. It
will also require an accurate and acceptable process
for providing appropriate models to learn a form of
noncorrupt, ethical policing.
Dealing with Corruption and Abuse.
When confronted with particular instances of
corruption or abuse, advisors must first determine to
what extent the behavior is culturally driven or if it is an
aberration. If the latter, then enforcement of the relevant
law, regulation, or policy is the most appropriate way
to deal with it. If the Iraqi leadership one is dealing
with lacks the will to do so, then advisors may consider
withholding support, or in the case of participation in
sectarian killings, detaining the suspected violators
themselves.
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If advisors determine that the behavior is driven
by cultural considerations, they must then break
apart which among those drivers are basic cultural
assumptions and which are espoused values, and
devise approaches to deal with each. Since behavior
is often manifested as a result of the combination of
multiple assumptions and values, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to discuss how this could be done in
every possible instance. Further, because of the context
sensitivity of such behavior, it will ultimately be up to
the individual advisor to take into account the range
of cultural, political, and environmental factors when
determining how best to proceed.
By way of example, we will consider the case of
detainee abuse. The basic assumptions which seem
to drive this behavior are the beliefs that (1) rights
of members of one’s group supersede the rights of
outsiders; (2) one has a moral obligation to protect
the member’s of one’s own group; and (3) detainees
are assumed guilty until proven innocent. This
last consideration is a feature of the Iraqi legal code
which places the burden on the suspect to prove his
innocence.
Though these considerations often drive such
abusive behaviors, they are not the only considerations
which may be brought to bear on the issue. As noted
earlier, what is valued in Islam is justice; confession
is merely a means to justice and thus must not be
obtained unjustly. Doing so violates a number of other
assumptions and values associated with Iraqi culture.
Now it would be naïve on the part of advisors
to believe that based on such an argument they
can convince Iraqis to abandon such practices. But
understanding that such a culturally based argument
is possible should then lead advisors to seek out
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culturally respected sources to address the issue
themselves. The more culturally aware the advisor is,
the better he will be able to determine what and who
those sources are. This can be done institutionally, as
in the creation of the Ethics Center, or on an individual
basis where respected religious, political, or police
leaders undertake an effort to eliminate the practice.
Given the current security environment and the
perceived high cost of failure, change will not be easy.
Such environmental conditions distort otherwise just
values, making it hard to change the behavior without
changing the environment, which in the Iraqi context,
is not often possible. But even in our own culture,
where values associated with individual rights are
much stronger, there has been a great deal of struggle
over determining what are and are not appropriate
interrogation techniques—a fact Iraqis will occasionally
remind advisors of.
Despite our own debate, we are able to discern
between violations of the law and debates about what
the law should be. Dealing with the former requires
vigorous enforcement of the law. Dealing with latter
takes much more time and requires the efforts of those
who wield authority within the culture to affect real
change. But since such practices are not only antithetical
to Islam but also prohibited by Iraqi law, resources are
available within the organization to effect reform.
It should be obvious, however, that any such
reform will take time. Unlike in the case of aberrations,
it may not be the best practice to withhold support
simply because the institution, as a whole, is unable
to constrain practices incompatible with just, effective
policing. But just because such practices may be rooted
in culturally driven considerations, it also does not
mean that advisors must continue to provide support
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unconditionally. It is still within the scope of the role
of the advisor to motivate the change necessary to
eliminate or at least shape the practice so it is not an
obstacle to police reform.
As noted earlier, successful cultural transformation
requires addressing the culture at the levels of artifact,
values, and basic assumptions. Doing so successfully
will not only require education programs aimed at
articulating new values and basic assumptions, but also
the adoption of new laws and regulation coupled with
a willingness to enforce them. Without such programs,
support for Iraqi security ministries and police will not
result in a just and effective police force. This analysis
suggests, then, that continued support for police reform
should be contingent on the following:
1. Identification of culturally accepted practices not
compatible with effective, just policing, and cooperation
with indigenous institutions to develop educational
programs aimed at either eliminating or shaping the
practices in such a way that they are compatible with
just, effective policing. Such practices will include
privileging, hiring and promotions of close relatives,
party members, or other associates as well as removal
of competent, but not close subordinates.
2. Identification of culturally tolerated, but
not accepted, practices and development and
implementation of an enforcement mechanism capable
of eliminating them. Such practices include human
rights abuses and corruption.
3. Effective Coalition doctrine, policies, and training
which account for how cultures interact in crisis
environments. This will include developing strategies
aimed at mitigating (or eliminating) the negative
effects of crisis on otherwise just application of cultural
norms.
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4. Support by senior Iraqi leadership for reforming
the ethical and human rights culture of the police
assessed in terms of willingness to devote resources
to enforcing Iraqi law and regulations as well as
establishing and maintaining an ethnically and
confessionally balanced force.
5. A functioning, independent internal affairs and
inspector general as evidenced by measurable increases
in arrests and prosecutions of Iraqi police suspected of
sectarianism, abuse, and/or corruption. The negative
behavioral model currently persistent within the
police forces will not be broken until persons acting in
accordance with it are held accountable.
6. Continued development and support for ethics
training and education. Despite high-level support,
other factors can undermine the development of
the requisite educational and training institutions
necessary to acculturate a new generation of Iraqi police
to democratic and humane policing. If these factors
overwhelm or undermine execution of robust ethical
training programs, then support should be withheld
until the situation can be rectified.
7. Increased levels of partnership between Iraqi
police and Coalition forces. At a minimum, every Iraqi
police station in major population centers should receive
daily, substantive visits by Coalition forces. Such visits
should focus on identifying and resolving conditions
which promote corruption and human rights abuse.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop this
completely, but the purpose of the Coalition presence
will be to ensure transparency, and to limit sectarian
or criminal influences from overwhelming local police
forces.
8. Unconditioned access for U.S. partners as well
as nongovernmental organizations to all levels of Iraqi
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police and MoI organizations and facilities. This is
necessary to ensure a positive obligation not to tolerate
injustice.
CONCLUSION
The underlying assumption of this paper has been
that Iraqi culture can sustain a just, effective police force,
capable of enforcing the rule of law in a democracy. It
seems racist to think otherwise. However, it is naïve to
think that such reforms will occur overnight or even at
all, as long as the current breakdown of political and
social institutions continues.
The ability to discern which practices are driven
by culture and which are driven by environment is
critical to developing any comprehensive strategy for
reform. Further, any such strategy must recognize that
reforming the Iraqi police is ultimately the job of Iraqi
leadership. The best Coalition advisors can do is to
encourage progress in the right direction and expose
those moments when Iraqis choose wrongly.
A journalist noted that when he was in Vietnam,
he was often told by U.S. officials—both military and
civilian—that corruption is “their way of life,” and as
such, must be tolerated. But such misguided cultural
relativism only serves to undermine one’s own cause.
As he noted, the victims of corruption and abuse were
not so forgiving. Wounded soldiers who did not get
treatment because their leaders sold their medicine, or
innocents arrested but not released until families paid
ransom, contributed to rising resentment directed at
the government. Ultimately, this corruption and abuse
directly contributed to the perception of illegitimacy
and the eventual collapse of the government. Many of
these same practices occur in Iraq today.
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Weaning Iraq’s security forces away from such
practices has proven to be one of the most complex tasks
undertaken by the U.S. military. To resolve successfully
the tensions that have emerged, military commanders
working with Iraq’s nascent security ministries must
directly confront corruption and human rights abuse.
But to do this effectively, they will require latitude
to account for political and cultural complexities in
dealing with these forces. This latitude, however,
should not be used as an excuse for turning a blind eye
to abuses. Otherwise we lose sight of the larger moral
aims we hope to achieve.
Perhaps the best indicator of hope is evidenced
by a conversation the author had with a senior MoI
official who had a reputation for corruption. During
a discussion about resourcing the ethics center, the
official enthusiastically agreed to support it. This is,
of course, easy to dismiss as bluster for the benefit of
the Coalition members present and would have been
dismissed as such had he not added his reasons for his
endorsement. He stated that he had lived in Europe for
over a dozen years after fleeing Iraq in the 1980s. He
stated that he noted a difference between the way the
European police and Iraqi police treated their citizens,
and he preferred the European way. The United States
may not be able to rid the Iraqi police of all corruption
and abuse, but this brief conversation indicates that
Iraqi leaders do have a vision of what good, democratic
policing looks like. It will just take U.S. and Coalition
support to get it there.
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